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Differential Game Approach for International
Environmental Agreements with Social Externalities
Lina Mallozzi∗, Stefano Patrı`∗∗, Armando Sacco†
Abstract In this work we study an N-player differential game, in which positive social exter-
nalities affect the payoffs of the players when they make an agreement. We divide the N players
in two homogeneous groups, N1 developed countries and N2 developing countries. For the lat-
ter, we consider a damage-cost function that evolves in time. We imagine the externalities as
the possibility that bilateral or multilateral agreements of various nature are by-products of an
International Environmental Agreement (IEA). After the determination of emissions solutions,
we use the externalities to investigate whether it is possible to have a self-enforcing agreement
on pollution emissions in the short run.
Keywords Differential game, self-enforcing agreement, social externality, asymmetric players
JEL classification C72, C73 * ** †
1. Introduction
A great part of environmental problems, like global warming, depletion of ozone layer
or loss of biological diversity, is related to global commons and, for that, requires
global policies. During the last three decades, many times countries organized meet-
ings to find an agreement on pollution control. In 1987 in the Canadian city of Mon-
treal, was ratified the Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Since 1995
the United Nations organize yearly conferences, Conferences of Parties, within which
in 1997 was signed the Kyoto Protocol for the reduction of Green House Gases (GHG),
with the objective to contain the global warming.
From an economic point of view, International Environmental Agreements (IEA)
lie within the coordination problem class. A natural approach to this kind of problem
is game theory. So, there is an extensive literature on this argument, that approaches
the problem both as cooperative and non-cooperative games, both as static and dy-
namic games. The first attempts set the issue in a static context (see e.g, Carraro and
Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994), and this way is still followed and gives some important
contributions. But pollution is an evolving phenomenon, so a dynamic game approach
can lead to more explicative results (see e.g., Casino and Rubio 2005; Rubio and Ulph
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2007; Breton et al. 2010). Both in static and dynamic context, the literature is divided
into two streams: cooperative and non-cooperative games. The main focus of the first
stream is to contrast the cooperative and non-cooperative solutions and to show the
benefits of cooperation. The real question in these games is how to allocate the payoff
among players.
The non-cooperative stream starts from the consideration that there is no suprana-
tional authority that can force countries to cooperate, thus players choose non-coopera-
tively whether join or not in a coalition. In this game it is necessary to specify the
concept of stability of the coalition. In line with the stable set definition (see von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern 1944), the terms most commonly used are those of internal and
external stability, introduced in d’Aspremont et al. (1983). In few words, these two
conditions say that a coalition is stable if none of the members has an incentive to de-
fect from cooperation and none of non-members has an incentive to join. So, the two
focus points are research of the solutions (emissions or abatement level) and research
of the coalition’s dimension.
We consider myopic players, that is to say that economic interests are still too
strong than environmental concern. It could be a limited point of view. There are rele-
vant examples, like EU, that put into the foreground the control of emissions. But, with
the arrival of the new millennium, the economic center of the world has changed his
coordinates, and with it the center of the environmental problems. The great challenge
now is to include in emissions reduction process those countries that are not considered
developed countries, but that give significant contribution to pollution (e.g, the coun-
tries called BRICS, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). We think that it is not
realistic to ask those countries to take care of environment for some kind of farsight-
edness or consider some kind of punishment for those who do not cooperate. So, we
want to try to design an IEA that is profitable.
This paper belongs to the non-cooperative games stream (for a recent surveys see
Jørgensen et al. 2010; Long 2010). We have a group of developed countries and a
group of developing countries. We suppose homogeneity within each group. We
also assume that the payoff of cooperators is affected by social externalities that is
a function of the coalition’s dimension. We recall this idea from Cabon-Dhersin and
Ramani (2006). They start from the evidence that, despite theoretic literature on non-
cooperative games supports only small coalition, principal agreements are signed by
many countries. Thus, their hypothesis is that when countries have to make the decision
to join or not an agreement, they consider all possible earnings due to relations with
other countries. In this way, they show that in a static game on abatement level, with N
symmetric countries, it is possible to have a grand coalition. Our purpose is to verify
whether their results are true also in a dynamic contest with asymmetric players. We
work on emissions instead on abatement levels (for a discussion on the duality between
emission and abatement level see Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis 2006; Finus 2001) and
include the social externalities in an N-player differential game in the framework of
Masoudi and Zaccour (2013). Thus, we have two different treatments for environmen-
tal concern of the two kinds of players. The idea is that developing countries have an
environmental damage-cost that is not full from the outset, but increases in time with
136 Czech Economic Review, vol. 9, no. 3
Differential Game Approach for International Environmental Agreements
the increasing of their cumulative revenue.
Our main focus is on two points:
1. To find the feedback-Nash equilibrium emissions both for cooperators and de-
fectors, and
2. to evaluate the size and the composition of the coalition by using the concept of
internal and external stability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the model.
In Section 3 we characterize the cooperative and non-cooperative emission solutions.
In Section 4 we discuss the stability of the coalition and show some numerical results
and Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1 Social externalities
Why a country should join an agreement for pollution control? This is the main is-
sue at which environmental economics literature tried to respond in the last decades.
Actually, two real issues should be considered. The first is the need to involve devel-
oping countries in emissions’ reduction process. The second is to consider the IEAs
within the complexity of a large number of relationships between countries. The mech-
anisms most used in economic literature to reach a large coalition are transfer scheme
strategies (see e.g., Fuentes-Albero and Rubio 2010; Pavlova and de Zeeuw 2013) and
trigger strategies (see e.g., Hoel and Schneider 1997). The idea of a transfer scheme
is that signatories use the gain from cooperation to convince defectors to join in the
coalition. On the other side, in the case of trigger strategies, the assumption is that
signatories have the power to punish the defectors.
A further way is the issue linkage literature (see e.g., Botteon and Carraro 1994;
Le Breton and Souberyan 1997; Hu¨bler and Finus 2013), in which the IEA is linked
with another agreements, that could be a R&D, or trade or another economic issues.
Considering the globalization of relations between countries, we think that transfer
scheme and trigger strategies are not credible mechanisms to enlarge an environmental
coalition. Issue linkage could be a suitable way to model an IEA, but we think that
specifying a kind of side agreement does not allow to take into account several other
connection between countries.
Our approach to solve the problem, is to assume that social externalities affect the
pay-off of players that decide to join in a coalition. From a mathematical point, we
assume that a strictly positive function is added to the pay-off of signatories, and this
function does not depend on emission, but only on the number of players in coalition.
The principal reason of that choice lies in the great flexibility of the possible interpre-
tation of what this externalities represent. We only request that when countries decide
whether to join a coalition, they consider the possible benefits deriving from being in
relationships with other countries. A classical example is Russia, that ratified the Ky-
oto protocol with the hope to have more consideration when its entry in World Trade
Organization (WTO) would have been voted. We can also imagine that collateral to
environmental agreement, other agreements, like trading, R&D ecc., could be signed
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(like in issue linkage literature). The immateriality of this social externalities brings
with it a certain degree of vagueness, because within this concept we include all the
possible networks that countries could establish. Nevertheless, we think that the loss
of descriptive power is acceptable, compared to the great flexibility that we gain.
2.2 Functional forms
We consider an N-player differential game, assuming the world divided in two types
of countries. So, we have a total number of players N = N1+N2, in which N1 are
developed countries and N2 are developing countries (N, N1 and N2 are integer num-
bers). We use 1 to denote developed countries and 2 to denote developing countries.
As usual, we proceed backward.
We first assume that a number k of players join the agreement, while the rest stays
out. In particular we take k= n1+n2, where n1 are developed countries and n2 are de-
veloping countries, and k,n1,n2 are integer numbers. The assumption that some players
that act cooperatively, while other players act non-cooperatively, belongs into partial
cooperative games (for a discussion see Mallozzi and Tijs 2008, 2009; Chakrabarti et
al. 2011). According to this assumption, we first solve the emission game and then
we use the optimal emissions to find the numbers n1 and n2 that satisfy the stability
conditions.
First of all, due to the fact that emissions are by-product of industrial activities,
and assuming that the function which relates emissions and production are smooth
and invertible, we can express the production for country i as a function of emission
levels. Denoting it with fi(ei), being ei the emission of country i, and assuming that
it is a concave and increasing function, that is a standard assumption in literature (see,
e.g., Finus 2001; Rubio and Casino 2005; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis 2006), we can
define the productions as
fi(ei) = αiei− 12e
2
i ,
where αi > 0, so that fi(ei) is positive for all suitable value of emissions.
Moreover, our hypothesis is that developed countries have a higher degree of in-
terest in environmental issues with respect to developing countries, both for economic
and historical motivations. In the end, this is the same approach of the Kyoto protocol.
The point is that a developing country needs to improve its infrastructure, increa-
sing per capita wealth, life expectance, instruction level, etc. In this context, envi-
ronment is a “luxury good”. In addition, the actual level of stock pollutant cannot be
attributed to developing countries.
So, we have a different degree of internalization of the environmental damage-
cost, that is given by a different definition of the damage-cost functions. Being S(t)
the stock of pollutant at time t, we denote by D1(S) the cost for developed countries
and we assume that it is full from the outset. We choose a linear function of stock of
pollutant, that is a not uncommon choice (see Hoel and Schneider 1997; Breton et al.
2010) and it is supported by some empirical estimation (see Labriet and Loulou 2003).
In the end, the difference between linear and a more realistic quadratic damage-cost
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function should be only quantitative, but not qualitative. Then, we assume
D1(S) = β1S,
where β1 > 0, so that the damage-cost function is an increasing function of stock of
pollutant.
On the other side, for developing countries the full damage-cost is related to the
achievement of a preset threshold in terms of cumulative discounted revenues, denoted
by Y2(t). The idea of linking income and environmental quality is not new in litera-
ture, there is the well-known environmental Kutznets curve (EKC) and some works,
like Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992), that support the empirical consistence of this
hypothesis. Then, denoting by ρ the rate of time preference, that we assume common
to all players, we have Y2(t) =
 t
0 fi(ei(z))e
−ρzdz. Given that relation, we can define
the time T as the instant (T > 0) at which a country of type 2 start to fully account the
damage-cost, that is the time at which T
0
fi(ei(t))e−ρtdt = Y2
is verified, where Y2 is the threshold chosen.
Then, for players 2 the damage-cost function is described for any t in two intervals:
d2(S, t) = tT γβ2S, ∀t < T,
D2(S) = β2S, ∀t ≥ T,
where β2 > 0. Moreover, we suppose γ ∈ {0,1}. The case γ = 0 is equivalent to say
that players of type 2 do not allow for pollution at all, until they reach the threshold Y2
(that’s the spirit of Kyoto protocol). If γ = 1, we are in the case of gradual internaliza-
tion of damage cost. The stock of pollutant S(t) is solution of the following differential
equation:
S˙(t) = µ

N
∑
i=1
ei(t)

−δS(t), S(0) = S0,
where µ is a positive scaling parameter and δ is the natural rate of absorption of pol-
lution. Here S0 is the initial value of the pollution.
From now on, we will skip the time argument if there is no risk of ambiguity. We
can introduce the payoff functions, that we denote by wi, i= 1,2, given by
w1 =
 ∞
0
( f1(e1)−D1(S))e−ρtdt,
w2 =
 T
0
( f2(e2)−d2(S, t))e−ρtdt+
 ∞
T
( f2(e2)−D2(S))e−ρ(t−T )dt.
The last function that we need to characterize is the social externalities, that we denote
by Ext(n1,n2). As in Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani (2006), we make the assumption that
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it is a positive linear function of the coalition size, as follows
Ext(n1,n2) = s1n1+ s2n2,
where we assume the marginal externality si to be positive for i = 1,2. Obviously,
with ni we state the number of players of kind i that join in coalition, precisely ni ∈
{0,1, ...,Ni}, i= 1,2.
3. Emission Solution
In this section we characterize the emission solutions both for signatories and defectors.
We suppose that we have a setC of signatory players, with n1 developed countries and
n2 developing countries and a set of defectors, that we denote with NC. Then, the
cardinality of the two sets is given by |C|= n1+n2 and |NC|= N1−n1+N2−n2. As
usual, every player j ∈ NC maximizes his own welfare, while players in C maximize
the joint welfare. Due to homogeneity within groups, we just have to find four emission
solutions: two for signatories (called eC1 and e
C
2 ), and two for the defectors (called e
NC
1
and eNC2 ).
Thus, the problem for defectors is:
max
e1
 ∞
0
( f1(e1)−D1(S))e−ρtdt, (1)
and
max
e2
 TNC
0
( f2(e2)−d2(S, t))e−ρtdt+
 ∞
TNC
( f2(e2)−D2(S))e−ρ(t−TNC)dt (2)
s.t. S˙(t) = µ

N
∑
1
ei(t)

−δS(t), S(0) = S0.
For signatories, the joint maximization is:
max
e1,e2
 TC
0
(n1 f1(e1)+n2 f2(e2)−n1D1(S)−n2d2(S, t)+Ext(n1,n2))e−ρtdt+ ∞
TC
(n1 f1(e1)+n2 f2(e2)−n1D1(S)−n2D2(S)+Ext(n1,n2))e−ρ(t−TC)dt,
(3)
s.t. S˙(t) = µ

N
∑
1
ei(t)

−δS(t), S(0) = S0.
In the maximization problems we call TNC and TC the instants of time at which
a developing country achieves the threshold to become developed, respectively in the
cases of defector and signatory. It seems clear from the optimization problems that we
consider a feedback emission game, but an open-loop membership game.
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3.1 Emissions of defectors
To solve the problem, we use the dynamic programming method. We proceed back-
ward, solving first the problem on [TNC,∞). So, we have to solve first:
max
ei
 ∞
TNC

αiei− 12e
2
i −βiS

e−ρ(t−T
NC)dt,
s.t. S˙(t) = µ

n1eC1 (t)+n2e
C
2 (t)+(N1−n1)eNC1 (t)+(N2−n2)eNC2 (t)

−δS(t),
where S(0) = S0. Using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations, we find the solu-
tion:
eNCi (t) = αi−µ
βi
ρ+δ
, i= 1,2. (4)
Since the functional forms for players of type 1 is the same in the entire period, we
have that the emissions of developed countries are in [0,TN ]:
eNC1 (t) = α1−µ
β1
ρ+δ
.
For developing countries we have to consider the different damage-cost function, so
the problem is:
max
e2
 TNC
0

α2e2− 12e
2
2− γ
t
TNC
β2S

e−ρtdt,
s.t. S˙(t) = µ

n1eC1 (t)+n2e
C
2 (t)+(N1−n1)eNC1 (t)+(N2−n2)eNC2 (t)

−δS(t),
where S(0) = S0. In this case HJB equation leads us to the emissions, for t ∈ [0,TN ]:
eNC2 (t) = α2−µ
β2
TNC(ρ+δ )2

γ

1+ t(ρ+δ )− e(ρ+δ )(t−TNC)+
+TNC(1− γ)(ρ+δ )e(ρ+δ )(t−TNC)

.
(5)
3.2 Emissions of signatories
As the previous case, we proceed backwards to find the optimal emissions of signato-
ries. First of all we solve the problem in [TC,∞):
max
e1,e2
 ∞
TC

n1

α1e1− 12 e
2
1

+n2

α2e2− 12 e
2
2

−n1β1S−n2β2S+ s1n1+ s2n2

e−ρ(t−T
C)dt,
s.t. S˙(t) = µ

n1eC1 (t)+n2e
C
2 (t)+(N1−n1)eNC1 (t)+(N2−n2)eNC2 (t)

−δS(t),
where S(0) = S0.
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We want to highlight that the externalities has no effects on the determination of
the emissions. Using HJB, we determine the solution for signatory countries as:
eCi (t) = αi−µ
n1β1+n2β2
ρ+δ
, i= 1,2. (6)
In the period [0,TC], the different damage-cost function implies that the optimal solu-
tions solve:
max
e1,e2
 TC
0

n1

α1e1− 12 e
2
1

+n2

α2e2− 12 e
2
2

−n1β1S−n2γ tTC β2S+ s1n1+ s2n2

e−ρtdt,
s.t. S˙(t) = µ

n1eC1 (t)+n2e
C
2 (t)+(N1−n1)eNC1 (t)+(N2−n2)eNC2 (t)

−δS(t),
where S(0) = S0. The optimal emissions are given by:
eCi (t) = αi−µ
n1β1
ρ+δ
−µ n2β2
TC(ρ+δ )2

γ

1+ t(ρ+δ )− e(ρ+δ )(t−TC)+
+TC(1− γ)(ρ+δ )e(ρ+δ )(t−TC)

,
(7)
where i= 1,2. Nevertheless, we will see that externalities will effect the payoffs of the
players.
4. Stability
In order to approach the stability analysis, we use the concept of self-enforcing agree-
ments. The idea is due to d’Aspremont et al. (1983). They use this concept to study the
stability of a cartel, but in several places, it is also used to discuss the stability of en-
vironmental agreements. We want to highlight that these conditions are more stringent
and there are different papers that try to propose different ways to face the problem
(see Finus 2003; Eyckmans and Finus 2006). The basic idea is that a coalition is stable
if no one inside has an incentive to defect and no one outside has an incentive to join
in. So, called wi the pay-off of a player i, a coalition of k players is stable if
wCi (k)≥ wNCi (k−1), wNCj (k)≥ wCj (k+1)
are verified ∀i ∈C and ∀ j ∈ NC. First condition is called internal stability, while the
second is called external stability.
In our case, having two different types of players, we need to adapt the definition,
requiring that internal and external stability are verified both for developed and devel-
oping countries. So, we have to find the values n1 and n2 that solve this system of four
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inequalities: 
wC1 (n1,n2)−wNC1 (n1−1,n2)≥ 0,
wC2 (n1,n2)−wNC2 (n1,n2−1)≥ 0,
wNC1 (n1,n2)−wC1 (n1+1,n2)≥ 0,
wNC2 (n1,n2)−wC2 (n1,n2+1)≥ 0.
(8)
As the agreements are revised periodically, we focus our analysis only on the short
term, that is the period [0,T ]. Unfortunately, we are not able to solve the system
analytically, due to the complexity and to the nonlinearity of the functions. So, we
analyze the problem from a numerical point of view. We make some simulations using
the software Wolfram Mathematica. The first step is the calibration of parameters in a
benchmark model, that we summarize in Table 1.
Table 1. Benchmark parameters for developed (Type 1) and developing (Type 2) countries
i=1 i= 2
αi 3.38 2.32 µ = 0.64
βi 0.0031 0.0048 δ = 0.0083
si 0.08 0.1 ρ = 0.01
To calibrate the parameters of production and damage-cost functions we use the
World Bank data set of emissions, expressed in kg per purchasing power parity (PPP)
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). We use the aggregate data of the developed coun-
tries and the upper middle income countries, within that we have all the developing
countries with a significant industrial structure (e.g., BRICS). Based on this division of
the World Bank, we set N = 10, with N1 = 6 and N2 = 4.
Moreover our choice of δ and µ is based on Nordhaus (1993). The parameters
s1 and s2 in the function Ext(n1,n2) are chosen sufficiently small not to overestimate
the effect of the social externalities. Because by our simulation the starting level of
pollution seems to be not relevant for the stability, we can assume S0 = 0. We make
two different studies, one with γ = 0 and one with γ = 1. In the following, we present
only the case latter case, because it is more interesting for the sensitivity analysis and
the case γ = 0 does not present substantial differences.
The first values that we have to compute are TNC and TC, taking every time a
suitable value for Y 2, which depends on the production function. As we expected, we
have always TNC ≤ TC, so we focus our simulation on the interval [0,TNC]. After
that, we solve the differential equations for S(t) in the different configurations required
by stability conditions. Having all the elements we need, we can proceed with the
simulation of stability. We evaluate the 32 possible coalitions, due to the different
combinations of variables n1 and n2.
The benchmark model gives an univocal result: the only stable coalition is the
grand coalition. What we observed is that all possible coalitions are internally stable,
but no one is externally stable, that means that all players have an incentive to join
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Figure 1. Internal stability for developed countries as function of s1 and s2, with n1 = 6 and
n2 = 4
0.05
0.10
s1
0
0.05
0.10
s2
20
10
0
10
20
w6,4w6,3
Figure 2. Internal stability for developing countries as function of s1 and s2, with n1 = 6 and
n2 = 4
the agreement. Another thing we learn from this model is that the grand coalition
stops being stable only if the parameters s1 and s2 converge to zero. In Figures 1
and 2 we represent the internal stability conditions of the system (8), as function of
the two parameters s1 and s2.1 We can see that the coalition is unstable if there are
no social externalities or if at least one of the two groups gives little weight to non
environmental possibilities given by the agreement. We make the same simulations
on smaller coalition and the surfaces that we obtain have a shape very close to that of
Figures 1 and 2.
Going forward with our sensitivity analysis, we pass to the parameters of the pro-
duction function, α1 and α2. The results of the simulations say that, while there is
no effect due to a change in α1, the parameter α2 influences the stability only in the
measure of change of TNC, but the grand coalition is still the only stable.
We obtain different results if we test the sensitivity of the model to variations in
damage-cost parameters, β1 and β2. In this case an increment of the vulnerability to
1 Clearly, we have not external stability conditions in case of Grand Coalition. We make some simulation
on external stability for smaller coalition, and we found that the qualitative results are symmetric to these.
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Table 2. Stable coalitions for simultaneous variation of β1 and β2
Marginal costs sensitivity
β1 = 0.0062 β1 = 0.0016 β1 = 0.0062
β2 = 0.0024 β2 = 0.0096 β2 = 0.0096
Stable coalitions (5,0) (0,4)
(0,4)
(5,0)
(1,3)
(2,2)
(4,1)
the damage of pollution can make large coalitions unstable. The first test we make in
this sense in taking a double value of β1, that is β1 = 0.0062, given the values of the
other parameters. This increment brings to a situation of homogeneity: we still have a
unique stable solution, but now the coalition is formed only by developed countries, in
fact the solution couple is (n1,n2) = (5,0).
The next step is the evaluation of an increment in the value of β2, so we take
β2 = 0.0096, given the other parameters as in the benchmark model. The results are
symmetric to the previous one: We have only one stable and homogeneous coalition,
but in this case it is the one formed only by developing countries, that is (n1,n2) =
(0,4). The difference is that this coalition consists of all the developing countries,
while above we have a coalition formed by all but one developed countries.
We also test the effects of a simultaneous variations of parameters β1 and β2. We
first try to balance out the growth of one parameters with a reduction of the other. In
the first column of the Table 2, we show the results on the stability in the case that
β1 is doubled and β2 is the half. As we can see, reduction of the latter doesn’t bring
some compensation in terms of stable coalitions and the only stable coalition is still
(n1,n2) = (5,0). The same thing happens in the second column of Table 2, in which
β1 decreases and β2 increases. Also in this case, the only stable coalition is (n1,n2) =
(0,4). Then, decreasing one of the marginal damage costs can not compensate in
any an increase of the other damage cost. More interesting the last column, in which
both parameters are doubled. In this case we have an enlargement of the set of stable
solutions, which now includes also the mixed coalitions (1,3), (2,2) and (4,1).
5. Conclusions
To develop efficient policies on pollution control, stability of an International Environ-
mental Agreement is the key. In this work we investigated a non-cooperative N-player
differential game, in which we divided the world in two types of players, developed
and developing countries. For the latter we assumed an evolving damage-cost func-
tion, taking into account the particular issues of this countries. Our main contribution
is to recall the idea of social externalities, investigated by Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani
(2006) in a static context with symmetric players, and to verify its validity in a more
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general and realistic context.
First of all we characterized the emission solutions both for signatories and defec-
tors, assuming as a date the size of the coalition. After that, we used these solutions to
study the stability of the agreement. Due to the non-linearity and the complexity of the
model, we analyzed the problem with numerical simulations.
Our benchmark model shows that we can have just one stable coalition, namely a
coalition of all players. Moreover, this coalition become unstable only if the parame-
ters s1 and s2 converge to zero. Nevertheless, there is a significant sensitivity to the
parameters β1 and β2, so if they increase, we have smaller stable coalitions. To con-
clude, we want to highlight two possible ways to extend the model. The first point is to
consider a feedback game also for the membership, including the possibility that play-
ers join the agreement in different times. The second one is to consider a higher degree
of asymmetry, going beyond the assumption of homogeneity within the two groups of
countries.
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Appendix
A. Emissions of defectors
To solve the problem, we use dynamic programming. For given time TNC, we proceed
backward, solving first the problem on [TNC,∞). We have to solve first:
max
eNCi
 ∞
TNC

αieNCi −
1
2
(eNCi )
2−βiS

e−ρ(t−T
NC)dt,
s.t. S˙(t) = µ

N
∑
1
ei(t)

−δS(t), S(0) = S0.
If we denote with v(t,S) the value function of the problem, we can write the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation as
− vt =max
eNCi

αiei− 12 (e
NC
i )
2−βiS

e−ρt + vS

µ
N
∑
j=1
e j−δS

. (9)
Solving the first order conditions in (9), we obtain an expression for the optimal emis-
sions
eNCi (t) = αi+µvSe
ρt .
Let us assume that value function v(t,S) is linear in S:
v(t,S) = (KS+L)e−ρt ,
with partial derivatives vt = −ρ(KS+ L)e−ρt and vS = Ke−ρt . So, emissions for a
player i outside coalition are given by
eNCi (t) = αi+Kµ.
In order to find an expression for the parameter K, we substitute vt , vS and ei inside (9):
ρ(KS+L)e−ρt =

αi(αi+Kµ)− 12 (αi+Kµ)
2−βiS

e−ρt +K

µ
N
∑
j=1
e j−δS

e−ρt
ρ(KS+L) = α2i +αiKµ−
1
2
α2i −
1
2
K2µ2−αiKµ−βiS+Kµ
N
∑
j=1
e j−KδS
ρKS+ρL=−(βi+Kδ )S+ 12α
2
i −
1
2
K2µ2+Kµ
N
∑
j=1
e j.
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By the principle of identity of polynomials, we can write the equation
ρK =−βi−Kδ ,
from which we have that K =− βiρ+δ .
Finally, we have the expression of the emissions of defectors
eNCi (t) = αi−µ
βi
ρ+δ
, i= 1,2. (10)
We proceed now to find the optimal emissions for t ∈ [0,TNC]. Since the functional
forms for players of type 1 is the same in the entire period, we have that the emissions
of developed countries are the same in [0,TNC]:
eNC1 (t) = α1−µ
β1
ρ+δ
, ∀t ≥ 0.
For developing countries we have to consider the different damage-cost function, so
the problem is:
max
eNC2
 TNC
0

α2eNC2 −
1
2
(eNC2 )
2− γ t
TNC
β2S

e−ρtdt,
s.t. S˙(t) = µ

N
∑
1
ei(t)

−δS(t), S(0) = S0.
In this case the HJB equation is given by
− vt =max
e2

α2e2− 12e
2
2− γ
t
TNC
β2S

e−ρt + vS

µ
N
∑
j=1
e j−δS

. (11)
As usual, we derive the first order conditions from maximization in (11)
(α2− e2)e−ρt + vsµ = 0 ⇒ eNC2 (t) = α2+ vSµeρt .
For the value function v(t,S) we assume
v(t,S) = [x(t)S+ y(t)]e−ρt ,
whose partial derivatives are:
vt = [(x′(t)−ρx(t))S+ y′(t)−ρy(t)]e−ρt and vS = x(t)e−ρt .
The optimal emissions are given by
eNC2 (t) = α2+µx(t).
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Now, we have to substitute vt , vS and e2 inside (11)
−[(x′(t)−ρx(t))S+ y′(t)−ρy(t)]e−ρt =

α2(α2+µx(t))− 12 (α2+µx(t))
2− γ t
TNC
β2S

e−ρt+
+ x(t)

µ
N
∑
j=1
e j−δS

e−ρt .
Rearranging with respect to the principle of identity of polynomials, we can write the
differential equation 
−x′(t)+(ρ+δ )x(t) =−γ tTNC β2,
x(TNC) =− β2ρ+δ .
The solution x(t) is given by
x(t) =− β2
TNC(ρ+δ )2

γ

1+ t(ρ+δ )− e(ρ+δ )(t−TNC)+
+ e(ρ+δ )(t−T
NC)TNC(ρ+δ )(1− γ)

,
and leads us to the developing countries’ emissions, for t ∈ [0,TNC]:
eNC2 (t) = α2−µ
β2
TNC(ρ+δ )2

γ

1+ t(ρ+δ )− e(ρ+δ )(t−TNC)+
+TNC(1− γ)(ρ+δ )e(ρ+δ )(t−TNC)

.
(12)
B. Emissions of signatories
As for the defectors’ case, we assume as known the time TC and we proceed backward.
First of all solve the problem for t ∈ [TC,∞):
max
eC1 ,e
C
2
 ∞
TC

n1

α1eC1 −
1
2
(eC1 )
2

+n2

α2eC2 −
1
2
(eC2 )
2

−n1β1S−n2β2S+
+ s1n1+ s2n2

e−ρ(t−T
C)dt,
s.t. S˙(t) = µ

n1eC1 (t)+n2e
C
2 (t)+(N1−n1)eNC1 (t)+(N2−n2)eNC2 (t)

−δS(t),
S(0) = S0.
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We want to highlight that the externalities have no effects on the determination of the
emissions. Let v(t,S) be the value function, the HJB equation is
− vt =max
eC1 ,e
C
2

n1

α1eC1 −
1
2
(eC1 )
2

+n2

α2eC2 −
1
2
(eC2 )
2

−n1β1S−n2β2S

e−ρt+
+vS

µ

n1eC1 +n2e
C
2 +(N1−n1)eNC1 +(N2−n2)eNC2

−δS

+(s1n1+ s2n2)e−ρt

.
(13)
The first order conditions in (13) are given by
n1[(α1− eC1 )e−ρt +µvS] = 0,
n2[(α1− eC2 )e−ρt +µvS] = 0,
from which we can derive the expressions for emissions
eC1 (t) = α1+µvSe
ρt , eC2 (t) = α2+µvSe
ρt .
The steps are the same: we choose a guess for value function, then we substitute its
partial derivatives and the emissions in equation (13). So, take
v(t,S) = (AS+B)e−ρt ,
whose partial derivatives are: vt = −ρ(AS+B)e−ρt and vS = Ae−ρt . Then optimal
emissions are given by
eC1 (t) = α1+µA, e
C
2 (t) = α2+µA.
Substituting in (13), we can derive an expression for parameter A
ρA=−n1β1−n2β2−Aδ ,
so that, A = − n1β1+n2β2ρ+δ . Then, the emission solutions for cooperative countries, for
t ∈ [TC,∞), are given by
eCi (t) = αi−µ
n1β1+n2β2
ρ+δ
, i= 1,2. (14)
Now, we can proceed to find the feedback Nash equilibrium for signatory players in
the interval [0,TC]. The different damage-cost function implies that the cooperative
solutions solve:
max
eC1 ,e
C
2
 TC
0

n1

α1eC1 −
1
2
(eC1 )
2

+n2

α2eC2 −
1
2
(eC2 )
2

−n1β1S−n2γ tTC β2S+
+ s1n1+ s2n2

e−ρtdt,
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s.t. S˙(t) = µ

n1eC1 (t)+n2e
C
2 (t)+(N1−n1)eNC1 (t)+(N2−n2)eNC2 (t)

−δS(t),
S(0) = S0.
If we denote with v(t,S) the value function, than the HJB equation is
−vt =max
eC1 ,e
C
2

n1

α1eC1 −
1
2
(eC1 )
2

+n2

α2eC2 −
1
2
(eC2 )
2

−n1β1S−n2γ tTC β2S

e−ρt+
+ vS

µ

n1eC1 +n2e
C
2 +(N1−n1)eNC1 +(N2−n2)eNC2

−δS

+
+(s1n1+ s2n2)e−ρt

.
(15)
As usual, we compute the first order conditions in (15), to obtain a characterization
for signatories’ emissions. So
n1[(α1− eC1 )e−ρt + vSµ] = 0,
n2[(α2− eC2 )e−ρt + vSµ] = 0,
from which eCi (t) = αi− vSµ , i= 1,2.
We need to give a guess for value function, and we choose, as in the previous cases,
a linear function of S
v(t,S) = [g(t)S+ z(t)]e−ρt ,
whose partial derivatives with respect to t and S are
vt = [(g′(t)−ρg(t))S+ z′(t)− z(t)]e−ρt , vS = g(t)e−ρt .
The expression of vS gives us the emission solutions
eCi = αi+µg(t), i= 1,2.
To conclude the computation of the Nash equilibrium, we need to find an expression
for the function g(t). The way is to substitute vt , vS and ei, i = 1,2, inside (15). With
some algebra, and because of the continuity of value function, we have to solve the
dynamical system −g
′(t)+(ρ+δ )g(t) = n1β1+n2γ tTC β2,
g(TC) =−n1β1+n2β2
ρ+δ
.
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The system has a unique solution g(t), as follows
g(t) =− n1β1
ρ+δ
− n2β2
TC(ρ+δ )2

γ

1+ t(ρ+δ )− e(ρ+δ )(t−TC)+
+TC(1− γ)(ρ+δ )e(ρ+δ )(t−TC)

.
Finally, the emissions for signatory players, when t ∈ [0,TC], are given by:
eCi (t) = αi−µ
n1β1
ρ+δ
−µ n2β2
TC(ρ+δ )2

γ

1+ t(ρ+δ )− e(ρ+δ )(t−TC)+
+TC(1− γ)(ρ+δ )e(ρ+δ )(t−TC)

,
where i= 1,2.
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